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Abstract. The proof of God’s existence, known as Ratio Anselmi, is being 
analyzed. Four first-order theories are constructed to mirror versions of Anselm’s 
reasoning. God’s existence is shown to be provable in all of them. A traditional 
objection to the employment of a concept of God is overruled. And yet, Anselm’s 
proof is eventually found to be incorrect. The error attributed to Anselm consists 
in an illegitimate use of the words “greater” and “conceivable”, and is identified 
as quaternio terminorum or petitio principii, depending on circumstances. It is 
claimed that there is no direct way to improve the argument.
by Ratio Anselmi I  understand the original proof of God’s existence, 
provided by Anselm of Canterbury in chapter 2 of his work called 
Proslogion. The proof is usually regarded as the first attempt to prove 
God’s existence a  priori (ontologically) in history. my objective is to 
analyze that original proof as carefully as possible and evaluate it, as 
correct or not, on a precisely indicated ground. The so widely discussed 
and often formalized proof of chapter 3 of Proslogion as well as later 
ontological proofs are disregarded in this paper.
INTerPreTATIoNs
What Anselm claims in chapter 2 of Proslogion is so difficult to understand 
that among scholars there is no agreement even regarding what kind of 
text one has to do with. m. Cappuyns, in his excellent summary1 of all 
1 m. Cappuyns, ‘l’argument de s. Anselme’, Recherches de theologie ancienne et 
medievale, 6 (1934), pp. 313–330.
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studies concerning Ratio Anselmi until 1934, distinguishes four general 
kinds of interpretations or attitudes towards Anselm’s text: logical, 
psychological, cosmological and theological. Cappuyns’ summary seems 
to remain standing. only in the first interpretation is Ratio Anselmi 
regarded as an argument (either sound or not) from some premises to 
a conclusion. In the psychological interpretation, Anselm simply affirms 
the fact of God’s presence in mind, in the cosmological interpretation 
one has to do with a supplement to Monologion, and in the theological 
interpretation one has to do with an  affirmation of the act of faith. It 
should be claimed that in this paper it is just assumed that Ratio Anselmi 
is an argument, an attempt to prove God’s existence.
even if one is convinced that Anselm’s text is an argument, there is 
still a  lot of philosophical interpretations of its meaning. Hence why 
Ratio Anselmi is so difficult to understand; I am going to analyze it on 
the purely logical level. The only non-vernacular meaning I  am going 
to attribute to Anselm’s statements is the meaning required by a formal 
structure of premises. To achieve such an  objective, one must use 
a formal tool that is most transparent and uncontroversial. That would 
be the first order logic.
PROSLOGION, CHAPTer 2
In the chapter 2 of Proslogion Anselm concludes to God’s existence as 
follows. God is a being than which nothing greater can be conceived. 
suppose than there be no God in reality. by the supposition itself God 
exists in someone’s mind and it is thinkable that God exists in reality. 
A  being that exists in one’s mind only is not a  being than which no 
greater can be conceived, for its real existence is clearly conceivable. And 
real existence is something greater than existence in one’s mind only. 
so, Anselm concludes, a being than which no greater can be conceived 
exists in reality.2 Anselm’s argument rests on five premises. Four of them 
appear straightforwardly in Proslogion:
(P0) God is a being than which nothing greater can be conceived,
(P1) a being is conceivable than which nothing greater can be conceived,
(P2) if x is conceivable, then x is conceivable qua existent,
(P3) x qua existent is greater than x qua non-existent.
2 Anselm, Proslogion, chapter 2.
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There is another vital premise to be accepted:
(P4) if x is conceivable, but not conceivable qua non-existent, then x exists.
The premise (P4) is hidden. As far as I am aware Anselm never admitted 
it, but the premise is inevitable. It will shortly be shown formally.
The premise (P0) may be found in Anselm’s opening words: “and 
indeed, we believe that you are a  being than which nothing greater 
can be conceived” (“et quidem credimus te esse aliquid quo nihil maius 
cogitari possit”).3 some readers find here a  definition of God, which 
is neither necessary nor obvious. The famous formula “a  being than 
which nothing greater can be conceived” may be a definition as well as 
a partial description of God. It may even be just a postulate. It depends 
on whether the uniqueness of such a being is determined or not. This is 
why the indefinite article “a” is better and more safe english translation 
of “aliquid” than the definite article “the”.
The premise (P1) is based on the fact that, even to deny God’s 
existence, one simply must conceive of God. Anyone who takes the 
question of God into consideration makes some use of the concept of 
God. Anselm invokes the fool figured in the Holy scripture, mostly in 
Psalms (cf. The Book of Psalms 14:1 and 53:1, in the Biblia Sacra Vulgata, 
the latin version Anselm used, 13:1 and 52:1 respectively). The fool 
figures that there is no God: “is there no such nature [God], since the 
fool has said in his heart, there is no God?”, says Anselm (“an ergo non 
est aliqua talis natura, qia dixit insipiens in corde suo: «non est Deus?»”)4. 
Thus, according to Anselm, the fool determines God’s conceivability: 
“but, at any rate, the very fool, when he hears of the being I  speak of 
– a being than which nothing greater can be conceived – understands 
what he hears, and what he understands is in his understanding, 
although he does not understands it to exist” (“sed certe ipse idem 
insipiens, cum audit hoc ipsum quod dico: aliquid quo maius nihil cogitari 
potest, intelligit quod audit; et quod intelligit, in intellectu eius est, etiam si 
non intelligat illud esse”)5. And again: “hence, even the fool is convinced 
that something, than which nothing greater can be conceived, exists at 
least in understanding; for, when he hears of it, he understands it, and 
whatever is understood, exists in understanding” (“convincitur ergo 





hoc, cum audit, intelligit, et quidquid intelligitur, in intellectu est”)6. so, if 
one affirms God’s existence, they conceive of God, and if one denies it, 
they also conceive of God. All in all, God is conceivable. To avoid a kind 
of criticism most naive, it should be immediately noticed that Anselm 
is perfectly aware of an ontological commitment. Although he has no 
proper terminology, he determines straightforwardly the difference 
of existence and conceivability (existence in reality and existence in 
understanding). An  artist, Anselm says, first conceives of what he is 
going to perform, and, until he does not perform it, it exists in the artist’s 
understanding only. Hence, objects existing in an  understanding only 
are just objects of the understanding. It was examined and explained 
by N. malcolm: “Anselm [...] uses «intelligitur» and «in intellectu est» 
as interchangeable locution; the same holds for another formula of his: 
whatever is thought is in thought (quidquid cogitatur in cogitatione est)”.7
In the premise (P2) a  relation is affirmed between general 
conceivability and conceivability qua existent. First, according to 
Anselm, when a being is conceived of, it may be conceived either qua 
existent or qua non-existent. And those are two distinct thoughts. To 
conceive of an object is not the same as to conceive the object to exist: 
“for an  object to be in understanding and to understand an  object to 
be are two different things” (“aliud enim est rem esse in intellectu, alium 
intelligere rem esse”).8 but, Anselm continues, if an object is conceived 
at all it is also conceivable qua existent. You can always think an object 
to exist, provided you can think of the object: “even if [an object] exists 
in understanding alone, then it can be conceived to exist in reality” 
(“si enim vel in solo intellectu est, potest cogitari esse et in re”).9
According to the famous premise (P3), to exist in reality is something 
greater than to exist in understanding alone (“si enim vel in solo intellectu 
est, potest cogitari esse et in re, quod maius est”).10 The discussion 
dedicated to the passage just quoted is enormous. Plenty of ontological 
ideas came into being as regards the mysterious concept of Anselmian 
greatness. The problem is that Anselm seems to consider the hierarchy 
of greatness to be obvious, whereas for a contemporary philosopher it is 
 6 Ibidem.
 7 N. malcolm, ‘Anselm’s ontological Arguments’, The Philosophical Review, 69 (1960), 
pp. 41–62 (p.41).




hardly imaginable. I only refer to the features of the hierarchy formally 
determined by the premises themselves. No further philosophical 
analysis seems to me substantial for evaluation of the argument.
The hidden premise (P4) allows one to infer an object’s existence from 
the inconceivability of its non-existence. It is a version of the assumption 
of some intelligibility of being. It is stated here that an object x exists, 
provided x is inconceivable qua non-existent, but conceivable generally. 
Although the premise is hidden, it may seem quite reliable. Actually, the 
whole science rests on the assumption of intelligibility of being.
THe THeorY Pros
To analyze Ratio Anselmi I  will employ the first-order logic. In some 
formalizations modal logic is employed, which is even more controversial 
than Ratio Anselmi itself. Furthermore, Anselm’s original thought is 
difficult to recognize in some formal constructions. They are at most 
inspired by Anselm, and more so by Descartes or leibniz.
I  provide four first-order theories of ratio Anselmi: Pros, Pros(a), 
Pros(b) and Pros(c) – where Pros stands for Proslogion. They differ in 
a position and interpretation of the premise (P0), the alleged definition of 
God. The crucial point of the formalization I deliver is the relativization 
of an  object to an  agent. It seems vital for Anselm’s thought, and yet 
rarely respected. The first theory, Pros, is an extended and substantially 
improved version of a theory I provided in an earlier work of mine.11
The language of the theories I provide is typical for a first-order theory. 
In the alphabet there are the connectives of negation “¬”, conjunction 
“∧”, disjunction “∨”, implication “→” and equivalence “≡”, the identity 
sign “=”, the universal quantifier “∀”, the existential quantifier “∃” and 
the unique existential quantifier (for exactly one, for one and only one) 
“∃!”, definable as follows:
(1) ∃!x: A(x) ≡ ∃x: A(x) ∧ ∀x,y: (A(x) ∧ A(y) → x = y).
Individual variables “u”, “w”, “x”, “y” and “z” range over two domains – 
possible agents and objects they may conceive of. I  do not determine 
yet whether the agents are perfectly rational (logically omniscient) or 
not. The objects conceivable by the agents are mere objects of the agents’ 
understanding, intensional objects. They need not – although they may 
11 m. Tkaczyk, ‘Is the ontological Proof of God’s existence an ontological Proof of 
God’s existence?’, Logic and Logical Philosophy, 16 (2007), pp. 289–309.
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– exist in reality. In the alphabet there are four specific predicates to form 
atomic formulas:
C(x, y) - x is conceived of by y,
Q(x, y) - x is conceived of qua existent by y,
H(x, y, u, w) - x, conceived of by y, is greater than u, conceived of by w,
E(x)  - x exists (in reality).
The letter “C” stands for “conceived”, the letter “Q” stands for “qua 
existent”, the letter “H” stands for “hierarchy” and the letter “E” stands 
for “exists”. In some strengthened versions of Pros there will be an extra 
specific term, namely the individual term “g” (for “God”), either primitive 
or defined. There may also appear a one-place derivative predicate “G”, 
which is going to mean “is a god” or “is divine”. If it is used, it will be 
introduced by a definition. Punctuation signs and formation rules are 
typical. so is the order of operations in absence of parentheses: ∃, ∀, ¬, 
∧, ∨, →, ≡. Tautologies are accepted as logical axioms, logical rules are 
applicable, free variables in theorems are universally quantified.
In the theory Pros, four specific axioms (A1)–(A4) are to be accepted, 
respectively to Anselm’s premises (P1)–(P4). The first axiom:
(A1) ∃x,y: (C(x, y) ∧ ¬∃y,u,w: H(u, w, x, y))
is a counterpart of Anselm’s premise (P1). It is stated that there is such 
an object x that x is conceived of by some agent and no object conceived 
of by any agent is greater than x conceived of by any agent. The second 
axiom:
(A2) C(x, y) → ∃u: Q(x, u)
is a counterpart of Anselm’s premise (P2). If any object x is conceived of 
by any agent, then, for some agent u, u conceives of x qua existent. The 
third axiom:
(A3) Q(x, y) ∧ ¬Q(x, u) ∧ C(x, u) → H(x, y, x, u)
is a  counterpart of Anselm’s premise (P3). According to the axiom 
an object x conceived by y is something greater than the same object x 
conceived of by u, provided y conceives of x qua existent and u conceives 
of x qua non-existent. There is another axiom:
(A4) ∃y: C(x, y) ∧ ∀y: (C(x, y) → Q(x, y)) → E(x)
which is a  counterpart of the hidden premise (P4). According to it 
an object x exists (in reality), provided x is generally conceived by some 
agent and no agent conceives of x qua non-existent. Anselm’s premise 
(A0) has no counterpart among axioms for the time being. Hence, we do 
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not use the term “God” yet. The definition of a proof and of a theorem 
is typical. The theory Pros is consistent, which is important, for any 
formula is provable in an  inconsistent theory. It is worth noting that 
many formalizations lack a proof of consistency. We are going to provide 
the proof of consistency of Pros, but we postpone it until we consider all 
the versions of Pros.
Within the confines of the theory Pros, the existence (in reality) is 
provable of an object than which nothing greater can be conceived. The 
derivation seems quite straightforward.
1. ∃x,y: (C(x, y) ∧ ¬∃y,u,w: H(u, w, x, y)) axiom (A1)
2. C(x, y) → ∃u: Q(x, u) axiom (A2)
3. Q(x, y) ∧ ¬Q(x, u) ∧ C(x, u) → H(x, y, x, u) axiom (A3)
4. ∃y: C(x, y) ∧ ∀y: (C(x, y) → Q(x, y)) → E(x) axiom (A4)
5. ∃x: (∃y: C(x, y) ∧ ∃u: Q(x, u) ∧ ¬∃y,u,w: H(u, w, x, y)) 1, 2
6. Q(x, y) ∧ ¬Q(x, u) ∧ C(x, u) → ∃y,u,w: H(u, w, x, y) 3
7. Q(x, y) ∧ ¬∃y, u, w: H(u, w, x, y) → ¬(¬Q(x, u) ∧ C(x, u)) 6
8. Q(x, y) ∧ ¬∃y,u,w: H(u, w, x, y) → (C(x, u) → Q(x, u)) 7
9. Q(x, y) ∧ ¬∃y,u,w: H(u, w, x, y) → ∀y: (C(x, y) → Q(x, y)) 8
10. ∃u: Q(x, u) ∧ ¬∃y,u,w: H(u, w, x, y) → ∀y: (C(x, y) → Q(x, y)) 9
11. ∃x: (∃y: C(x, y) ∧ ∀y: (C(x, y) → Q(x, y)) ∧ ¬∃y,u,w: H(u, w, x, y)) 5, 10
12. ∃x: (E(x) ∧ ¬∃y,u,w: H(u, w, x, y)) 4, 11
In the row 12 the theorem appears to state that, for some x, x exists (in 
reality) and no object conceived of by any agent is greater than x. That 
is the formal counterpart for Anselm’s conclusion within the confines of 
the theory Pros.
Notice, nothing has been spoken of God explicitly thus far, the term 
“God” has not been used in any way yet, for no use has been made of Anselm’s 
premise (P0). so there has been no prejudice made as regards a concept of 
God. Hence, the theory Pros, as well as the derivation just presented, may 
be considered as a general template to formalize Ratio Anselmi. A genuine 
formalization requires the complement of a counterpart of the premise (P0), 
and versions of the theory Pros depend on one’s philosophical preferences 
regarding the premise in question. There are three considerable and reliable 
analyses of the premise (P0): (a) a definition of a singular term “God”, (b) 
a definition of a predicate “is a god” or “is divine”, and (c) a constraint, 
a partial characterization of God. Those will be the three versions of the 
theory Pros: Pros(a), Pros(b) and Pros(c).
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THe THeorY Pros(a)
If one is convinced that a proper definition of God is provided in the 
premise (P0), the introduction of an individual term denoting God may 
be a considerable solution to state an explicit claim of God’s existence. To 
do so, however, another premise is required in Ratio Anselmi, stating the 
uniqueness of the object than which nothing greater can be conceived:
(P5) there is at most one being than which nothing greater can be conceived.
This is required for the consistency of a  definition of an  individual 
term. Together with the premise (P1) it secures the condition of 
existence and uniqueness to the individual term to be defined. The 
claim of the uniqueness of God is hardly questionable in the case of 
a  Christian thinker and future bishop. Furthermore, it is admitted by 
Anselm explicitly in a succeeding passage of Proslogion (“quid es, nisi id 
quod summum omnium solum existens per seipsum, omnia alia fecit de 
nihilo?”),12 although it is not even mentioned in chapter 2. Nevertheless, 
it is a real strengthening of the theory. And anyone who thinks of future 
justification of premises should consider that profit and loss account. For 
it is a well known fact that to philosophically justify the uniqueness of 
God is a highly complicated matter even within the confines of Aquinas’ 
ontology. However, if such price is to be paid, the new axiom:
(A5a) ¬∃z,u,w: H(u, w, x, z) ∧ ¬∃z,u,w: H(u, w, y, z) → x = y
would serve as a  counterpart for the premise (P5). It is stated here that 
any two objects, x and y, than which nothing greater can be conceived, are 
identical. A  theory Pros strengthened with the new axiom (A5a) will be 
called Pros(a). The axiom (A5a), together with the axiom (A1), with respect 
to the definition (1) allows to derive the existence and uniqueness condition:
(2) ∃!x: ¬∃y,u,w: H(u, w, x, y).
Hence, since (A1) and (A5a) are axioms of Pros(a), the formula (2) is 
a theorem of Pros(a). That legitimates a definition of the individual term 
as consistent:
(3) g = x ≡ ¬∃y,u,w: H(u, w, x, y).
The term “g” so defined stands for “God” and the definition is, of course, 
a  counterpart of Anselm’s premise (P0). It is stated here that God is 
the object than which nothing greater can be conceived. That would 
12 Anselm, Proslogion, chapter 5.
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complete the description of the theory Pros(a). As Pros, the theory 
Pros(a) is consistent. A derivation of Anselm’s key theorem within the 
scope of Pros(a) may look as follows.
1. ∃x,y: (C(x, y) ∧ ¬∃y,u,w: H(u, w, x, y)) axiom (A1)
2. C(x, y) → ∃u: Q(x, u) axiom (A2)
3. Q(x, y) ∧ ¬Q(x, u) ∧ C(x, u) → H(x, y, x, u) axiom (A3)
4. ∃y: C(x, y) ∧ ∀y: (C(x, y) → Q(x, y)) → E(x) axiom (A4)
5. ¬∃z,u,w: H(u, w, x, z) ∧ ¬∃z,u,w: H(u, w, y, z) → x = y axiom (A5a)
6. ∃!x: ¬∃y,u,w: H(u, w, x, y) 1, 5
7. g = x ≡ ¬∃y,u,w: H(u, w, x, y) definition based on row 6
8. ∃y: C(g, y) ∧ ¬∃y,u,w: H(u, w, g, y) 1, 7
9. C(g, y) → ∃u: Q(g, u) 2
10. Q(g, y) ∧ ¬Q(g, u) ∧ C(g, u) → H(g, y, g, u) 3
11. ∃y: C(g, y) ∧ ∀y: (C(g, y) → Q(g, y)) → E(g) 4
12. ∃y: C(g, y) ∧ ∃u: Q(g, u) ∧ ¬∃y,u,w: H(u, w, g, y) 8, 9
13. Q(g, y) ∧ ¬Q(g, u) ∧ C(g, u) → ∃y,u,w: H(u, w, g, y) 10
14. Q(g, y) ∧ ¬∃y,u,w: H(u, w, g, y) → ¬(¬Q(g, u) ∧ C(g, u)) 11
15. Q(g, y) ∧ ¬∃y,u,w: H(u, w, g, y) → (C(g, u) → Q(g, u)) 12
16. Q(g, y) ∧ ¬∃y,u,w: H(u, w, g, y) → ∀y: (C(g, y) → Q(g, y)) 13
17. ∃u: Q(g, u) ∧ ¬∃y,u,w: H(u, w, g, y) → ∀y: (C(g, y) → Q(g, y)) 14
18. ∃y: C(g, y) ∧ ∀y: (C(g, y) → Q(g, y)) 12, 17
19. E(g) 11, 18
Hence, the theory Pros(a) is a little more complicated than Pros. but the 
reward is the theorem that appears in row 19: God exists (in reality). 
And, no matter what the traditional objection against Ratio Anselmi is, 
no logical error has been committed when introducing the term “g” by 
means of the definition (3) (cf. row 7).
THe THeorY Pros(b)
Instead of a term “God”, a predicate “is a god” or maybe “is divine” could 
be introduced and defined to avoid the question of the uniqueness of 
God. If the derivative formula
 G(x)
is to be read: x is a god, the axioms (A1)–(A4) are sufficient and may 
remain unchanged. The definition:
(4) G(x) ≡ ¬∃y,u,w: H(u, w, x, y)
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may complement the theory. That would be a counterpart for Anselm’s 
premise (P0) here. It is stated here that any x is a  god if and only if 
the x is a being than which nothing greater can be conceived. And no 
assumption regarding the number of such beings is being made. There 
may be exactly one god among objects of thought, as well as many gods, 
even infinitely many, or, finally, no gods whatsoever. such a definition, 
if properly constructed, requires no further conditions to be consistent. 
The theory Pros(b) described like that is consistent. It is actually Pros 
itself, enriched with one derivative term.
To prove God’s existence within the confines of the theory Pros(b) 
we proceed exactly as we do in the theory Pros, until row 12 (cf. page 6). 
Then proceed as follows.
13. G(x) ≡ ¬∃y,u,w: H(u, w, x, y) definition
14. ∃x: (E(x) ∧ G(x)) 12, 13
The theorem proven in the theory Pros(b) claims, for some x, x exists 
(in reality) and is a god (is divine). Which means, there is at least one 
god among existent objects. The introduction of Anselm’s premise (P0) 
in that way is practically costless. As it has been already mentioned, 
Pros and Pros(b) are practically equivalent. on the other hand it is at 
least disputable to what degree Anselm’s original philosophy has been 
faithfully recounted.
THe THeorY Pros(c)
There is a  third solution. Anselm’s premise (P0) may be considered 
a  partial description of God rather than a  normal definition. To say 
that an elephant is a mammal may not be a definition of an elephant, 
although it is a statement concerning the elephant. similarly, to say that 
God is a being than which nothing greater can be conceived may not be 
a definition of God. such a view is formalized in the theory Pros(c). The 
term “g” is an individual name of God. However, it will not be defined, 
but rather included into the alphabet as a primitive term. so, the term “g” 
may appear in specific axioms and it is at least partially characterized by 
the axioms. In the theory Pros(c), the axiom (A1) is to be replaced with 
another one:
(A1c) ∃y: C(g, y) ∧ ¬∃y,u,w: H(u, w, g, y).
The axiom (A1c) will serve for a counterpart of both premises (P0) and 
(P1): the first conjunct is a  counterpart of the premise (P1), whereas 
the other one is a  counterpart of the premise (P0). In the axiom it is 
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stated that God is conceived of by an agent – the premise (P1) – and 
that nothing greater than God can be conceived of by any agent – the 
premise (P0). The axioms (A2)–(A4) remain unchanged and no further 
assumption is to be made. Again, the theory Pros(c) is consistent. The 
proof of God’s existence within the confines of the theory Pros(c) may be 
conducted as follows.
1. ∃y: C(g, y) ∧ ¬∃y,u,w: H(u, w, g, y) axiom (A1c)
2. C(x, y) → ∃u: Q(x, u) axiom (A2)
3. Q(x, y) ∧ ¬Q(x, u) ∧ C(x, u) → H(x, y, x, u) axiom (A3)
4. ∃y: C(x, y) ∧ ∀y: (C(x, y) → Q(x, y)) → E(x) axiom (A4)
5. C(g, y) → ∃u: Q(g, u) 2
6. Q(g, y) ∧ ¬Q(g, u) ∧ C(g, u) → H(g, y, g, u) 3
7. ∃y: C(g, y) ∧ ∀y: (C(g, y) → Q(g, y)) → E(g) 4
8. ∃y: C(g, y) ∧ ∃u: Q(g, u) ∧ ¬∃y,u,w: H(u, w, g, y) 1, 5
9. Q(g, y) ∧ ¬Q(g, u) ∧ C(g, u) → ∃y,u,w: H(u, w, g, y) 6
10. Q(g, y) ∧ ¬∃y,u,w: H(u, w, g, y) → ¬(¬Q(g, u) ∧ C(g, u)) 9
11. Q(g, y) ∧ ¬∃y,u,w: H(u, w, g, y) → (C(g, u) → Q(g, u)) 10
12. Q(g, y) ∧ ¬∃y,u,w: H(u, w, g, y) → ∀y: (C(g, y) → Q(g, y)) 11
13. ∃u: Q(g, u) ∧ ¬∃y,u,w: H(u, w, g, y) → ∀y: (C(g, y) → Q(g, y)) 12
14. ∃y: C(g, y) ∧ ∀y: (C(g, y) → Q(g, y)) 8, 13
15. E(g) 4, 14
The theorem derived in row 15 refers to God’s existence straightforwardly. 
The theory Pros(c) combines the simplicity of the theory Pros with the 
efficiency of the theory Pros(a). That seems to be quite a recommendation, 
but still the choice between the presented variants of the theory Pros 
remains open and should depend mainly on philosophical investigations.
FormAl FeATures oF THe THeorIes
As has already been mentioned a few times, all the formal theories we 
presented, i.e. Pros, Pros(a), Pros(b) and Pros(c), are consistent. It may be 
easily shown by means of interpretation in arithmetic of natural numbers 
including zero. To transform formulas of the theories in question into 
formulas of arithmetic, read
C(x, y) as x = y,
Q(x, y) as x = y,
H(x, y, u, w) as x>y+u+w
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and
E(x) as x = x.
Furthermore, regarding the theory Pros(c) only, read “g” as zero. under 
such interpretation, all the axioms in question - (A1), (A1c), (A2), (A3), 
(A4) and (A5a) - turn out to be true statements of arithmetic. Derivative 
terms - “g” in Pros(a) and “G” in Pros(b) - do not require interpretation, 
for the respective definitions - (3) and (4) - are formally correct.
A similar interpretation shows the hidden premise (P4) to be vital. 
As it has been claimed, although the premise (P4) does not appear in 
Anselm’s text explicitly, it is definitely unavoidable in the reasoning. so, 
if one reads
C(x, y) as x = y,
Q(x, y) as x = y,
H(x, y, u, w) as x > y + u + w
and
E(x) as x ≠ x
the axioms (A1), (A2) and (A3) are transformed into true statements of 
arithmetic, whereas the axiom (A4) is transformed into a false statement 
of arithmetic. similarly Anselm’s theorem of God’s existence, derived 
in the theory Pros (cf. the derivation on the page 6, row 12) is also 
transformed into a false statement of arithmetic. This proves that both 
the axiom (A4) and the theorem derived are independent from axioms 
(A1), (A2) and (A3). so, the axiom (A4) is substantial. Analogical 
considerations show the premise (P4) to be inescapable in all versions 
of the theory Pros.
THe CoNCePT oF GoD
The chief objection voiced commonly to Ratio Anselmi concerns the way 
Anselm makes use of the concept of God. It is claimed to be illegitimate to 
conclude from a definition or a concept of an object to the existence of that 
object (“l’objection calassique contre l’argument de S. Anselme est qu’il fait 
sortir l’existence de la pens´e”).13 And what Anselm did appears to be exactly 
such a  conclusion, so he seems to prejudice the case in favour of God’s 
existence at the starting point. of course, the premise (P0) sits in the dock.
13 e. Gilson, ‘sens et nature de l’argument de saint Anselme’, Archives d’histoire 
doctrinale et litteraire du moyen age, 9 (1934), pp. 5–51 (p. 6).
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The objection was raised immediately, when Anselm had issued 
Proslogion, by a mysterious monk called Gaunilo of marmoutiers, the 
author of Liber pro insipiente. Gaunilo points out a concept of a perfect 
desert island, lost somewhere in oceans and absolutely unknown 
(“aiunt quidam alicubi oceani esse insulam, quam [. . . ] fabulantur multo 
amplius quam de fortunatis insulis fertur, diuitiarum deliciarumque 
omnium inaestimabili ubertare pollere, nulloque possessore aut habitatore 
uniuersis allis quas incolunt homines terris possidendorum redundantia 
usquequaque praestare”).14 If Anselm’s reasoning was correct, no one, 
who understood the concept, might doubt such an  island to exist in 
reality. For an existent island is greater (i.e. better) than a nonexistent 
one, and so the non-existent one is not perfect (“non potest ultra dubitare 
insulam illam terris omnibus praestantiorem uere esse alicubi in re [...] 
quia nisi fuerit, quaecumque alia in re est terra, praestantior illa erit, ac sic 
ipsa iam a te praestantior intellecta praestantior non erit”).15
The objection took classical shape in Contra Gentiles by Thomas 
Aquinas. He claimed clearly that there was no legitimate conclusion 
to be drawn from a  concept to existence in reality, although there 
may be a  legitimate conclusion drawn from a  concept to existence in 
understanding (i.e. conceivability or conceivability qua existent). so, 
Anselm’s reasoning must not be correct (“eodem enim necesse est poni 
rem et nominis rationem; ex hoc autem quod mente concipitur quod 
profertur hoc nomine «deus» non aequitur Deum esse, nisi in intellectu [...] 
et ex hoc non sequitur quod sit aliquid in rerum natura, quo non majus 
cogitari non possit”).16 The objection of Gaunilo and Aquinas was to be 
repeated over and over again during the following centuries, but no one 
put it better than they.
Although Gaunilo and Aquinas’ objection shows a  probably right 
feeling that something is wrong about Ratio Anselmi and that it has 
something to do with the concept of God, the objection thus voiced is 
certainly illegitimate. Nothing, but adversaries’ feelings, may prohibit 
one from using definitions in proofs of the existence of any objects. on 
the contrary, no proof can be conducted until it has been determined, at 
least partially, what the object of the proof is. For instance, to prove that 
in any set of natural numbers there is the smallest one, it is necessary to 
14 Gaunilo of marmoutiers, Liber pro insipiente, chapter 6.
15 Ibidem.
16 Thomas Aquinas, Contra Gentiles, I, 11.
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know what a natural number and the smallest number in a set is. The 
objection I speak of may be easily and immediately discredited by a brief 
observation of any of Aquinas’ proofs of God’s existence (the so called 
Five Ways). each of those five proofs ends with a similar statement: and 
that is what everyone calls God. For example, at the end of the kinetic 
argument (ex motu) one can read: “therefore it is necessary to arrive at 
a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands 
to be God” (“ergo necesse est devenire ad aliquid primum movens, quod 
a  nullo moveatur, et hoc omnes intelligunt Deum”).17 such a  phrase is 
perfectly analogical to that of Anselm: “truly there is, then, a being than 
which nothing greater can be conceived to exist, that it cannot even be 
conceived not to exist; and this being you are, o lord, our God” (“sic ergo 
vere est aliquid quo maius cogitari non potest, ut nec cogitari possit non 
esse; et hoc est tu, Domine Deus noster”).18
so, Aquinas makes no less a use of a concept of God than Anselm. 
The only difference is that Anselm puts it forward at the beginning, while 
Aquinas delays it to the end. And the difference is a matter of writing 
style only. Notice, there is no difficulty whatsoever to rephrase Anselm’s 
proof in, say, Aquinas’ style or contrarily.
To rephrase Anselm’s proof, consider the theory Pros. Within its 
confines, a theorem has been derived in row 12:
(5) ∃x: (E(x) ∧ ¬∃y,u,w: H(u, w, x, y))
with no use of any concept of God whatsoever. It is now legitimate to add 
the definition (4) in row 13, and immediately derive the statement of the 
existence of a god:
(6) ∃x: (E(x) ∧ G(x)),
like in the theory Pros(b). And if one is ready to strengthen the theory 
Pros by the addition of the axiom (A5a), to the effect of the uniqueness of 
the being than which nothing greater can be conceived, one can, again, 
derive the theorem (5) with no use of any concept of God. And finally, on 
the base of (A5a) and (5), the definition (3) may be introduced properly, 
which allows us to derive the existence of God:
(7) E(g),
like in Pros(a). And remember, in the theory Pros(c) Anselm’s reasoning 
is absolutely definition-free. so, generally, like Aquinas, Anselm may 
17 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, 2, 3.
18 Anselm, Proslogion, chapter 3.
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forget any concept of God and argue for the existence of an object than 
which nothing greater can be conceived. And, like Aquinas, finally, once 
everything has been done, he may call the object God on behalf of all of 
the human genus.
on the other hand, any Aquinas’ proof may be immediately rephrased 
to mirror Ratio Anselmi. Consider Aquinas’ kinetic proof19 in a slightly 
new version, say, Anselmian style. “Who are you, o God? We believe you 
are a first mover, put in motion by no other. Is there no such an object, 
since the fool has said in his heart, there is no God? but, if there is no first 
mover, there is no motion whatsoever, for whatever is in motion, is put 
in motion by another, and that by another again, and this cannot go on to 
infinity. so moving things do not actually move, but this is not possible.” 
If you rephrase Aquinas’ argument slightly like that, it appears to derive 
existence from a definition no less than that of Anselm.
A transformation of the objection I speak of concerns the ontological 
commitment of the first order logic. It is sometimes argued that any use 
of the existential quantification prejudices in favour of the existence of 
the object. That is a pure misunderstanding, for the existence expressed 
by the existential quantification is exactly belonging to the domain of 
quantification and nothing more, and the domain must not be empty. 
This does not determine either real or any other form of the existence 
of the objects the domain consists with. Imagine, for instance, two 
mathematicians: Tweedledum and Tweedledee. Tweedledum is 
a Platonist while Tweedledee is a nominalist. They may perfectly agree 
that there exists a natural quotient of the numbers 27 and 9, and yet in 
Tweedledum’s view numbers exist, whereas in Tweedledee’s view they 
do not. similarly, existential quantification in Anselm’s proof – at least if 
formalized like the theory Pros and its versions – determines that there is 
at least one object of understanding, i.e. at least one object is conceivable, 
not that it exists in reality.
THe WorD “GreATer”
Neither presence nor location of a  definition is vital for evaluation of 
a proof. However, the content of the definition is vital, unless one has 
to do with a  purely terminological convention. And it may be judged 
adequate or not, and hence, affirmed or rejected.
19 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, 2. 3.
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When the existence (or non-existence) of God is being proved, the 
issue is not an arbitrary object to be called God or anything else, by mere 
convention, for short. The issue is rather some object people think and 
speak of in common vernacular. And those thinking or speaking of God 
have at least an  indefinite feeling of what God approximately is. What 
is generally in force refers especially to Jewish, Christian and muslim 
thinkers. Particularly Christians face the challenge to justify the existence 
of God that is spoken of in the Nicene Creed.
Consider the premises (P0) and (P3). In the latter it is stated that to 
exist is something greater (in a  sense) than not to exist. Philosophers 
have put a lot of effort into the elucidation of the concept of greatness, 
achieving rather modest success. However, philosophical views 
concerning greatness are not substantial and may be disregarded without 
loss. It is enough to take into account the fact that existence is included 
into some hierarchy of being in a way described strictly in the axiom 
(A3). The term “greater” may be understood in any sense, provided the 
axiom (A3) is satisfied.
Proceed now to the premise (P0), according to which God is a being 
than which nothing greater can be conceived. Together with the premise 
(P3), that means God is more similar to existent objects than to non-
existent ones. God stands closer – in the sense of the premise (P3) – to 
existent than to non-existent objects. Now, if one believes in God, the 
maker of all that is, seen and unseen (cf. the Nicene Creed), the premise 
(P0) is a considerable view. However, if one is an atheist, one clearly must 
not accept the premise (P0). Atheism simply consists of the notion that 
the God that Christians believe in is not a  being than which nothing 
greater can be conceived (in the sense of the premise in question). 
According to any atheist, any existing object, including the piece of paper 
you read, is greater than God. For God simply does not exist. Hence, the 
premise (P0) simply states what is to be concluded to. such an error is 
usually called petitio principii.
on the other hand, if the premise (P0) governs the term “greater”, the 
Christian God is by definition a being than which nothing greater can 
be conceived. That concept would be something close to the concept of 
the Almighty of the Nicene Creed. According to Cappuyns this is just the 
case; namely, the definition of God as a being than which nothing greater 
can be conceived is most obvious and most common (“admise par tout 
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le monde et, en realite, tautologique”).20 An atheist is ready to accept such 
a concept of God, for it is deeply rooted in common vernacular. However, 
in that case the atheist simply must reject the premise (P3), for at least 
in one case a  non-existent being – namely, God as understood in the 
premise (P0) – is greater than an existent object – namely any existent 
being. And again, it is no sign of the atheist’s malice; it is just the content 
of the claim of atheism. similarly, petitio principii has been committed 
in Ratio Anselmi. Thomas Aquinas was probably quite close to revealing 
it. Arguing against Anselm, Aquinas wrote that to state that something 
greater can be thought than anything given in reality is a difficulty only 
to a  person who admits that there is in reality something than which 
nothing greater can be conceived (“non enim inconveniens est, quolibet 
dato vel in re, vel in intellectu, aliquid majus cogitari posse, nisi ei qui 
concedit esse aliquid, quo majus cogitari non possit in rerum natura”).21 
It might be the case that Aquinas, having accepted the premise (P0), 
understood that (P3) is simply illegitimate, false under such a sense of 
the word “greater”.
There is one more eventuality. Perhaps the term “greater” appears 
in Ratio Anselmi in at least two different meanings. once, in the 
premise (P0), in a sense close to the common vernacular, and again in 
the premise (P3), in the technical sense, rather obscure, but described 
sufficiently in the premise. Well, such an  error is called traditionally 
quaternio terminorum. No other policy seems to be imaginable. All in 
all, unfortunately, Anselm’s proof proves nothing.
THe WorD “CoNCeIVe”
There is another, quite similar, error in Ratio Anselmi. It is connected 
with the expressions “x is conceivable” and “x is conceivable qua existent”. 
They have been formalized as “∃y: C(x, y)”, which means that some agent 
(e.g. the fool) conceives of x in a way, and “∃y: Q(x, y)”, which means 
that some agent conceives of x qua existent, respectively. Conceivability 
may be understood in several ways, but in Anselm’s proof, because of the 
premise (P2), it must be a way that includes possibility somehow. objects 
of inconsistent descriptions, like a square circle, should be considered as 
inconceivable. It may be questioned whether or not physically impossible 
20 m. Cappuyns, ‘l’argument de s. Anselme’, p. 324.
21 Thomas Aquinas, Contra Gentiles, I, 11.
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or similar objects – like a cheese moon – are conceivable in that sense. 
Fortunately, that question may be disregarded here.
The crucial question to be posed refers to the domain of agents that 
the variables range over. There are two eventualities: either all agents 
are admissible, including logically fallible ones, or only those that are 
ideal, i.e. those perfectly rational. The point is, whether all agents being 
considered enjoy logical omniscience, i.e. the unrestricted ability to 
see logical consequences and the absolute freedom of logical errors 
(a  nightmare of all those occupied with epistemic logic). Now, look 
through the two eventualities.
suppose first, all agents are perfectly rational. In such a  case the 
premise (P1) is completely unjustified. both the biblical fools and 
sincere believers appear to conceive of God, for they think and speak of 
him. However, perhaps God is actually inconceivable, but they do not 
realize it. They may not be able to see or correctly judge all the logical 
consequences of the description of God. They may not be able to see, 
say, inconsistencies in the description of God, like Gottlob Frege had 
not noticed inconsistencies in his description of sets, until he received 
the famous letter from bertrand russell. so, in such a case it would only 
appear that God is conceivable, because an irrational agent often judges 
by appearances. No perfectly rational agent would ever judge such a God 
as being conceivable – at least in a sense meeting the premise (P2). In 
such a case Anselm must be reproached with petitio principii.
Consider in turn the other eventuality. suppose irrational, or at least 
fallible, agents are admissible. In such a case the premise (P1) is certainly 
justified. However, the hidden premise (P4) is not only unjustified, but it 
is certainly false. (And I proved that the axiom (A4), the counterpart of 
the premise (P4) is inevitable, cf. page 11.) It is stated in the premise in 
question that an object x exists (in reality), provided x is conceivable, but 
inconceivable qua non-existent. That would be a kind of principle of the 
rationality of being. Now, suppose an object x is conceived of by a single 
irrational agent a, who cannot see the impossibility of its existence. And 
a conceives of x qua existent. No other agent conceives of x, especially 
no perfectly rational agent ever conceives of x. Clearly, due to the agent 
a, the first conjunct of the antecedent of the axiom (A4) or the premise 
(P4) is satisfied. And so is the other conjunct, for there is no agent which 
conceives of x qua non-existent. Nevertheless, x must not exist. so, if 
fallible agents are admissible, the premise (P4) is not justified or even 
strictly false. That is, however, petitio principii once again.
145rATIo ANselmI reVIsITeD
Gaunilo took some note of the problem of the abilities of the agents 
when he claimed that no proof of God’s existence would have been 
necessary if God had been truly inconceivable qua non-existent (“uix 
umquam poterit esse credibile, cum dictum et auditum fuerit istud, non eo 
modo posse cogitari non esse, quo etiam potest non esse deus; nam si non 
potest: cur contra negantem aut dubitantem quod sit aliqua talis natura, 
tota ista disputatio est assumpta”).22 And it was John Duns scotus who 
first claimed clearly that conceivability in Anselm’s sense is not sufficient 
to justify the possibility of God’s existence.23
CoNClusIoNs
on the purely formal level, Ratio Anselmi is a piece of proper deduction. 
No illegitimate use of a  concept of God is being made. However, it is 
not sound and proves nothing except entailment between premises and 
conclusions of a sort. The meaning of the terms “greater” and “conceived” 
is indefinite, which causes the collapse of the whole proof. There is 
no direct remedy, for the meaning of a  term required by one premise 
is excluded by the other and conversely. some medieval thinkers, like 
Aquinas, Gaunilo and Duns scotus, might have been partially aware of 
some of those problems. However, none of them was able to phrase them 
in an adequate way. Perhaps it is the formalization which enables us to 
see assumptions and other interrelations between premises and other 
theorems, provided the formalization is accurate enough and the formal 
tool employed is transparent.
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